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Introduction 
Over the past ten to fifteen years there has been a remarkable shift in much of the 
literature on conflict in Muslim Mindanao. While traditionally, questions around 
violence and insecurity have focused on well-known armed groups such as the MILF 
(Moro Islamic Liberation Front) and the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) and 
their stance on questions of autonomy/independence, 1  more recently, a range of 
authors have shifted their attention towards everyday causes of violence within 
Muslim communities. These causes include a variety of issues such as local elections, 
land conflicts or adultery.2 In particular one research project conducted by The Asia 
Foundation (TAF) has been pivotal in this regard.3 In this research, it is demonstrated 
how the root causes of violence rarely concern large political questions about 
autonomy or independence but are instead rooted in everyday social interactions and 
tensions. The argument herein was not necessarily that previous research had it 
‘wrong’. Rather, what this body of literature pointed to is that it was crucial to study 
how different types of violence at different scales dynamically interact with each 
other and potentially reinforce each other. Next, this multi-level analysis inevitably 
drew attention to a new set of actors and organizations in the production of violence 
and insecurity, apart from the MILF and MNLF.    
Yet, despite this renewed focus on the diversity of actors and organizations, the 
foremost groups that entered the limelight in these new analyses were the clans and 
their respective coercive organization.4  This is not to say that clans as a unit of 
analysis have been absent in political, historical and sociological work on Mindanao. 
On the contrary, a range of studies have pointed to the central importance of clans as 
powerful groups in the socio-political landscape in Mindanao and the remarkable 
historical continuity of this from pre-colonial through to colonial and post-colonial 
times.5  However, this new body of literature clearly pointed out the highly coercive 
features of clan politics by putting emphasis on the issue of rido or clan feuding. It is 
argued by TAF that group formation and armed mobilization around certain disputes 
in Muslim Mindanao generally happens along these clan-lines. In another publication, 
                                                 
1
 Che Man, W.K. (1990). Muslim Separatism. The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of 
Southern Thailand, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2
 Kreuzer, P. (2005). Political Clans and Violence in the Southern Philippines, PRIF-report No. 71. 
Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt; Kreuzer, P. (2009). Private Political Violence and Boss-
Rule in the Philippines. Behemoth, 2(1), 47-63; Adam, J. (2013). A comparative analysis on the micro-
level genealogies of conflict in the Philippines’ Mindanao and Indonesia’s Ambon, Oxford 
Development Studies, 41 (2): 155-173. 
3
 Torres, W.M. (2007). RIDO: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao. Makati City: The 
Asia Foundation. 
4
 An interesting and recent book discussing the position of clans in Muslim Mindanao: Lara, F.J. 
(2014). Insurgents, Clans, and States. Political Legitimacy and Resurgent Conflict in Muslim 
Mindanao, Philippines, Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 
5
 Becket, J. (1993). Political Families and Family Politics Among the Muslim Maguindanaon of 
Cotabato, in: Alfred McCoy (ed.), An Anarchy of Families. State and Family in the Philippines, 
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 285-311;  Abinales, P. N. (2000). Making Mindanao: 
Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State, Manila: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press. 
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the German political scientist, Peter Kreuzer, explicitly approaches clans as ‘agents of 
violence’.6 Another important consequence of this overall shift in the focus of analysis 
is that it is now generally acknowledged that much of the violence in the region 
clearly has a strong intra-Muslim character instead of a Muslim minority versus 
Philippine state framing.  
As has been argued elsewhere,7 this refocusing of the literature has been welcome 
since it has not only enriched the debate on violence and conflict in Muslim 
Mindanao but has also provided a better insight into the functioning of the overall 
socio-political landscape in the region. Nevertheless, despite these important steps 
forward, some major lacunae remain. One of the most remarkable gaps in our 
knowledge of the region is that we still remain ill-informed about the one organization 
that is still considered to be the foremost Muslim armed group on mainland 
Mindanao, namely the MILF. Generally understood as a Muslim armed group 
expressing the deep-rooted grievances of a Muslim minority in a Christian dominated 
nation-state, there simply is no recent study which has systematically mapped the 
political and social development of the MILF over the past 15 to 20 years; the period 
wherein the MILF has come to trump the other major Muslim armed group, the 
MNLF.  Hardly any literature exists wherein the MILF is discussed in relation to 
matters of governance and regulation, religion and the mosque, social activities and 
redistribution.  Indeed, most of the data and information available still treats the MILF 
first and foremost as an armed organization. 8  As will be argued below, this 
assumption is highly reductionist and overlooks a wide range of activities in which 
the MILF is involved and where it has built up a direct and organic relationship with 
large parts of the civil population. Lastly, this lack of data and systematic research is 
all the more remarkable since the MILF still is the principal interlocutor in the current 
ongoing peace negotiations, which are explicitly framed as a consultation between the 
Philippine government and the MILF (not the clans!). Therefore, it is also clear that, 
at the moment, it is very difficult to predict what specific consequences a successful 
or failed peace agreement with the MILF will actually have on the ground.  
With this paper, we do not have the intention, nor do we have the ambition, to 
complete all the missing pieces in this complex puzzle; let alone to provide some sort 
of definitive assessment about the strength or power of the MILF. Instead, our aims 
are much more modest. Within this paper, we will attempt to obtain a better 
understanding of the role played by the MILF in initiatives of reconciliation, dispute 
settlement and justice more broadly. The reasons for this are threefold. First, there 
was an explicit objective to study and understand the role of the MILF as a 
                                                 
6
 Kreuzer, P. (2005), op.cit., p. 3. 
7
 Adam, J.; Verbrugge, B. and vanden Boer, D. (2014). Peace Making and State-Society Interactions in 
Conflict-torn Mindano, London: TAF-JSRP Paper 18 (Justice and Security Research 
Programme/London School of Economics). 
8
 Abuza, Z. (2005). The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20. State of the Revolution, Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, 28: 453-479; Özerdem, A. et.al. (2010). Identity, Ideology and Child Soldiering: 
Community and Youth Participation in Civil Conflict – A Study of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
in Mindanao, Philippines, Civil Wars, 12 (3): 304-325. 
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governance actor rather than just an armed actor. Second, within a region that is 
characterized by chronic insecurity, the provision of peace and justice is one of the 
prime avenues wherein political power and legitimacy is constantly being created. 
Thirdly, this arena is particularly suited to better understanding the relationship 
between clans and the MILF. As correctly observed by TAF and others, most of the 
violent disputes in Muslim Mindanao are framed and reproduced through clan lineage 
and therefore have an intra-Muslim character. It is therefore interesting to understand 
how an organization such as the MILF – that obviously wishes to be a binding force 
for all Muslims in the Philippines – attempts to deal with these clan-based, intra-
Muslim tensions.  With this objective in mind, we start from an analysis of a dispute 
settlement and reconciliation initiative in the municipality of Aleosan in North 
Cotabato. Methodologically, the data have been collected through a range of 
individual semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with a limited 
number of respondents (maximum 5). The respondents were selected based on their 
involvement in initiatives of conflict management and reconciliation. This group was 
then complemented with a broader sample of respondents consisting of politicians, 
(ex)-rebel members, and civil society leaders. Data collection took place during 
August and September 2014. For reasons of security, actual participant observation on 
site has been limited. Importantly, these specific data have been complemented with a 
variety of interviews, informal discussions and observations based on a wide range of 
research visits by the authors to different parts of the region over the past six years.  
Based on these data, the argument that will be put forward is that we urgently need to 
redefine and approach the MILF as a broad social movement, instead of just an armed 
group. While this may seem evident at first sight, this has some far-reaching 
ramifications and implications. First, it is through this social component, in 
combination with a considerable coercive capacity, that the MILF has managed to 
build up support among large sections of the Muslim population. This support is 
exemplified by a wide range of grassroots organizations which believe in and have 
managed to profile the MILF as a credible governance and development alternative. 
More specifically, within the arena of reconciliation and dispute settlement, a wide 
range of loosely affiliated grassroots organizations have attempted to establish 
impersonal and neutral fora through which highly divisive intra-Muslim feuds can be 
settled. Thus, there exists a dynamic interplay between a ‘core’ MILF and a range of 
affiliated grassroots organization that has been pivotal to the growth of the MILF. 
Secondly, this positioning of the MILF as a credible governance alternative cannot be 
separated from the highly coercive and elite-based features of socio-political life in 
the region. Although the MILF is very cautious of openly challenging existing centers 
of authority, for many grassroots supporters, the movement obtains its relevance and 
legitimacy as a movement based on a founding principle of equality wherein religion 
trumps a divisive clan/ethnic identity. As such, in particular for those parts of the 
population not belonging to a powerful clan, the MILF has managed to present itself 
as a credible and legitimate alternative of transparency, equality and justice set against 
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what is considered to be a highly corrupt and elite-controlled system of electoral 
democracy. 
Part 1: The multiple faces of the MILF 
Kinship affiliation and the state-rebel divide 
It is futile to try to understand ‘the MILF’ without embedding this organization into a 
complex network of broader societal relations. Whether an individual or a group will 
identify as MILF will depend on the circumstances; and overlapping identity labels – 
of which the MILF identity label is but one - are alternately deployed in a socio-
political environment which is volatile and subject to rapid change. This also implies 
that one should be critical about widely used labels such as ‘MILF territory’ or ‘MILF 
community’. These terms tend to be understood as spaces where the state is largely 
absent and the MILF is the principal organization providing basic governance 
functions. First, this rests on a false dichotomy wherein ‘the state’ and ‘the MILF’ are 
represented as two separate and opposing organizations. For instance, the barangay of 
Luanan  (municipality of Aleosan, province of North Cotabato) was described both by 
residents and non-residents alike as a true ‘MILF stronghold’. However, this did not 
imply that the state was absent or state institutions irrelevant. Rather what could be 
witnessed was a high degree of overlap. This is nicely captured when we asked a 
resident from the area how he judged the strength of the MILF in his village. The 
answer went: ‘100% MILF. Because even the barangay captain is a member of the 
political committee of the MILF. In this barangay, most of the people here are 
MILF’.9 Interestingly, what this quote points at is that the strength of the MILF is not 
understood as ‘overruling’ the state or statist institutions but its strength is explained 
through the strong symbiosis with the state and statist institutions. This also sheds 
additional light on how ‘strength’ or ‘power’ in this context needs to be understood. 
While in more classic accounts, the strength of a particular rebel is primarily analyzed 
through its particular coercive and infrastructural capacity in opposition to the state, in 
this particular case at least, it seems that an analysis needs to start from the specific 
linkages with the state.  
When used uncritically, a label such as ‘MILF community’ or ‘MILF territory’ risks 
portraying the MILF as a homogeneous and unitary organization. This is also 
misleading. Our intention herein is not to measure in one way or another how far the 
MILF is a divided organization.10 Nevertheless, what is clear is that the MILF cannot 
be understood as an armed organization disconnected from broader society. Rather, 
our empirical data strongly push for a relational understanding of the MILF, wherein 
different types of authority are linked together through intimate kinship connections. 
As a result, a question such as: ‘is it the state, the MILF or the clans holding power in 
a particular region in Muslim Mindanao?’ becomes irrelevant as these different 
                                                 
9
 Focus group discussion with politicians Luanan, Cotabato city (03-09-2014). 
10
 For a discussion on the supposedly fractionalized nature of the MILF, see: Abuza, Z. (2005). The 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28: 453-
479.  
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organizations can only be understood in relation to each other. The chances are 
hereby real (though not absolute) that power and authority are largely monopolized by 
a network simultaneously embodying these three fields.11 This observation also sheds 
some light on the policy by the MILF that their members should not participate in 
elections. For a selection of higher-ranking political and military leaders, this policy is 
definitely being followed. However, this does not imply that the MILF is absent from 
the political field. As will be illustrated below, kinship connections bridge the 
supposed distinction between the MILF and formal state institutions and secondly, 
there exists a set of actors only paying partial allegiance to the MILF and being 
deeply involved in electoral competition.   
An interesting illustration of this dynamic could be seen when attempting to 
reconstruct the life and family history of Jimmy Matalam,12  grandson of the late 
Udtog Matalam, life-long governor of Cotabato province and founder of the MIM 
(Muslim Independence Movement), one of the precursors of the MNLF. While it 
would take too long to provide a complete reconstruction of this remarkable family 
history, some important points can be mentioned which are relevant for our argument 
here. First of all, Udtog Matalam himself, despite his credentials for being one of the 
founders of the Muslim rebellion in Mindanao, always maintained a close relationship 
with the Philippine state (Abinales 2010: 123). This ambiguous stance between state 
compliance and anti-state rebellion has always characterized the Matalam family. 
Even as a high school student, Jimmy Matalam became involved as a member of the 
MNLF and at a later stage as an armed commander. Interestingly, this position as 
commander did not hinder his employment as a civil servant in the mayor’s office 
throughout the eighties (the mayor not coincidentally being his uncle). However, 
when a first demobilization program for MNLF fighters was organized after the peace 
agreement with the MNLF in 1996, Jimmy Matalam was among the first to join the 
AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines). In the meantime, many of Jimmy’s relatives 
had paid allegiance to the MILF, which at different moments was engaged in all-out 
war with the AFP. Even Jimmy himself was involved – albeit not in an immediate 
combat role - in the brutal siege on the MILF camp Abu Bakar in 2000. Interestingly, 
                                                 
11
 Obviously, there are some cases where clans have resisted any connection with the MILF. The most 
well-known example is without doubt that of the Ampatuan clan that – at least up until the 
Maguindanao massacre in November 2009 – politically dominated considerable areas in Maguindanao 
province while at the same disassociating themselves completely from the MILF. Another interesting 
example is constituted by the Dimaporo clan in Lanao that has a long history of openly defying the 
MILF and the MNLF, see: Bentley, Carter G. (1993). Mohamad Ali Dimaporo: A Modern Maranao 
Datu, in: Alfred W. McCoy (ed.), An Anarchy of Families. State and Family in the Philippines, 
University of Wisconsin: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 243-285. This was also witnessed 
when interviewing some prominent members of the Dimaporo clan. This clan simply considered 
themselves at war with the MILF and literally stated: ‘The MILF can only pass by in the municipality if 
they are being escorted by the military’ (Focus group discussion Municipality of Pantai Ragat, 24-09-
2013). Although any systematic study is lacking in this regard, it is clear that cases such as these where 
the MILF is openly challenged and defied are exceptional. Therefore, it can be stated that in mainland 
Muslim Mindanao an overlap exists – albeit ton varying degrees – between clan structures and the 
MILF and the two cannot be separated from each other.  
12
 Interview Jimmy Matalam, 19-09-2014, Cotabato city; Focus group discussion with 3 members of 
AFP, Cotabato city (01-09-2014). 
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all this has not – at least in the words of the respondent – deeply affected the family 
relationship. One of the foremost reasons being that clan solidarity is still considered 
to be the key strategy for maintaining power in Mindanao. As explained by Jimmy 
Matalam in a remarkably open-faced manner13:  
These are established clans and if something develops or establishes, like the 
revolutionary groups like MILF or MNLF… it makes sense for them to join the 
group, right? (…) so it makes sense to say that, if you want power, you should be 
both: a member of the MILF and the established clan, and also maybe the 
government. So you can play, that’s the dynamic. So you can influence the 
province. You’re beginning to understand the dynamics, right?  
Question: So, in your family there are both MILF and MNLF… To whom are they 
loyal? To the family or to the armed groups they belong to?  
To the family, secondary is the group. But they use the organization as their 
shield. And also, some in our family, most belong to politicians. So we also use 
the government as a shield.  And the MNLF, and the MILF.  
Question: And the AFP?  
(Laughter) That’s how it is, that’s the dynamics. 
Our point hereby is not necessarily a normative one wherein rebelling clans are being 
accused of ‘collaborating’ with the Philippine state. What is most important here is 
that these different fields of power and authority are not by definition understood as 
mutually exclusive. Another, rather funny example, which illustrates this point was 
encountered through an interview with a MILF member in the city of Illigan. Much to 
our surprise, when the actual person entered our meeting venue, this MILF member 
wore an official police costume (and turned out to be a local policemen) and 
introduced himself as a traditional leader.14   
Illustration: dispute settlement in barangay Luanan 
What interest us above all for this paper is the impact of this observation on matters of 
daily governance; more specifically on the dynamics of reconciliation and dispute 
settlement.  To illustrate this point, we refer to a dispute which gravely affected the 
village of Luanan for almost one year and a half. This dispute started off with the 
killing of a member of the Dalandas clan on April 12, 2011. Despite the lack of any 
conclusive evidence, it was immediately alleged that the explanation for this murder 
was the issue of an unpaid debt owed by a member of the Dalandas clan to a member 
of the Dandua clan, although this accusation has until now always been denied by the 
Dandua clan.  Shortly after the incident, the suspected perpetrator - who was also 
known as an MILF fighter - was taken into custody by his superior brigade MILF 
commander. This move needs to be understood foremost as a way to ensure the safety 
                                                 
13
 Focus group discussion with 3 members of AFP, Cotabato city (01-09-2014). 
14
 Interview with MILF member (Illigan, 16-09-2013). 
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of the suspect. Out of fear of further reprisals, the Dandua clan then decided to leave 
the village and settle in an evacuation center in Pikit. Yet, deprived of access to the 
agricultural lands that constituted the basis for their daily livelihood this community 
found itself in an utterly precarious situation. As a result, after about one year, they 
started making plans to return to the village of Luanan.  Adding to the frustration of 
the Dandua clan and their willingness to return was the fact that members of the 
Dalandas had occupied parts of their farming lands. It was at this moment that rumors 
started spreading about the impending return of the Dandua clan and weapons were 
purchased by both clans in anticipation of this resettlement. As a result, different 
people expressed their concerns that the existing tensions could potentially escalate 
into open warfare.  
Adding to this already tense situation were the intimate kinship connections of both 
clans with a range of MILF commanders. More specifically, the Dalandas clan had 
family ties with the MILF commanders  Datu Andik and Datu Doton of the 118th base 
command of the MILF-BIAF (Bangsomoro Islamic Armed Forces). The Dandua clan 
on the other hand had a kinship connection with commanders Salungga, Johnny and 
Tidy of the National Guard Division of the MILF-BIAF.15 The first problem was that 
an eventual confrontation between the two clans would drag in these commanders and 
their respective followers and coercive capacity, thereby considerably increasing the 
gravity and intensity of the confrontation. At the same time, the involvement of MILF 
commanders and fighters put heavy strains on classic third party mediation. Firstly, 
shortly after the displacement, the municipal political committee of the MILF in 
Aleosan had already attempted to reach a settlement but had failed to do so. 16 
Evidently, a clash between rival MILF commanders was something the political 
committee tried to avoid at all costs but their leverage to reach a solution was limited, 
since commanders from within their own ranks were so deeply involved. However, it 
was not only the MILF which was related. Both clans also had obvious political 
connections at the level of the barangay. For instance, the acting barangay captain 
(who also had a seat on the MILF municipal political committee) at the time was 
considered to be indirectly connected to the Dandua clan through a kinship lineage. In 
short, it seemed that the situation had reached a dangerous stalemate, since one of the 
conditions for successful third party mediation – that of having a neutral party with no 
ties to the conflicting parties - could not be fulfilled.  
It was at this specific moment that one particular civil society organization entered the 
picture, namely the Moro Women Development and Cultural Center (MWDECC).17 
Interestingly, the assistance of the MWDECC was called in, both by the barangay 
captain and the MILF municipal political committee. As stated in one focus group 
discussion with MWDECC volunteers, due to the close kinship ties between the 
                                                 
15
 The Asia Foundation (2012). Conflict Mitigation Program. The Case of Dandua and Dalandas 
Clans. Narrative Report, Manila: The Asia Foundation 
https://mwdecc.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/conflict-mitigation-terminal-report.pdf  
16
 Interview with member MILF political committee, Cotabato City (21-09-2014). 
17
 For more information, see: http://mwdecc.com/  
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MILF commanders and the clans: ‘MILF is very powerful, we believe, but sometimes 
MILF is not effective’.18 As a consequence, Sharia courts could not function as a 
plausible institutional forum to settle the dispute either, due to the very direct 
connection between Sharia courts and the MILF. In other words, the capacity of the 
MILF to act as a credible conflict mediator in this setting proved to be considerably 
curtailed due to the mediated nature of the organization wherein authority is often 
exerted through existing kin-based organizations. An observation that was – inter alia 
– confirmed by members of the MILF municipal political committee themselves. As a 
result, in coordination with another civil society organization called Local Peace 
Initiators-Mindanao Action for Peace and Development (LPI-MAPAD)19 and with 
some financial assistance from TAF, this organization came to act as a neutral third 
party to start a process of deliberation and negotiation between the two conflicting 
parties. The main advantage of calling in these civil society organizations obviously 
lay in their impartiality. As indicated by one LPI-MAPAD volunteer who was closely 
involved in the deliberations:  
‘Since they’re relatives, that is why the local commanders highly support the 
clans (...) That is why they need our intervention, because the commanders 
themselves cannot solve the problem; meaning they’re not eager to mitigate the 
conflict. That is why they need our intervention, our impartiality. We’re only 
using their influence to help our quest to establish an atmosphere of peace in the 
area. Because they themselves cannot, that’s why they need us. And also the 
barangay chairman was also involved, he also cannot solve the problem.’20 
The whole process of third party mediation that was then initiated concentrated on 
two contentious issues. Firstly, the terms for resettlement of the Dandua clan, and 
secondly, the amount of blood money to compensate for the killing of the Dalandas 
clan member. Interestingly enough, after the price of the blood money was set at 
20.000 Ps. (± 440 US $), this was then paid by the MILF municipal committee and 
some of the commanders related to the disputing clans.21 It is interesting to observe 
that once some sort of organizational structure was set up to conduct the mediation, 
the commanders and their immediate following were among the most vocal 
protagonists pushing for a negotiated deal. Ultimately, after the deliberations were 
concluded successfully, a festivity (kanduli) was organized in November 2012 which 
officially corroborated the return of the Dandua clan and wherein both parties agreed 
to refrain from using violence, thereby symbolically ending the dispute. This kanduli, 
where security was organized by about 200 MILF-BIAF members, was attended by a 
range of public officials including representatives of the PNP (Philippine National 
                                                 
18
 Focus group discussion with Quick Response Team, MWDECC members, Cotabato city (21-09-
2014). 
19
 LPI was a group of individuals who came together to address issues of Rido that were being tackled 
by MAPAD. Currently, it no longer exists as it developed into the ‘Local Initiative for Peace and 
Development in Mindanao’ (LIPAD MINDANAO). It now operates as an NGO independent of 
MAPAD. 
20
 Focus group discussion, LPI-MAPAD and MWDECC volunteers, Cotabato city (18-09-2014). 
21
 For a detailed account of this whole process, see: The Asia Foundation (2012), op. cit.  
9 
 
Police) and the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines). So far, no violent reprisals 
have occurred between the two clans.  
Conclusion 
In this first part, we have demonstrated how clan, MILF, and state cannot be 
understood as separate institutional fields. Instead, they are related through kinship 
connections and people display different allegiances depending on the specific 
circumstances. The authority that the MILF exerts in these places can therefore only 
be understood as one that is ‘mediated’ through existing centers of power and 
authority. Somebody can easily be a politician, clan-member and MILF 
sympathizer/fighter at the same time. In cases where these identities are not 
represented within one and the same person, links between these different 
organizations are maintained through intimate family connections. This observation 
has some important consequences in our understanding of complex conflict ecologies 
in the region and the manner in which dispute settlement and mediation is organized. 
First, one should be careful with the concept of rido or clan dispute, since this 
generally involves much more than just clan contradictions. These disputes have a 
tendency to absorb a wide range of social identities wherein clan/kinship affiliation 
acts as the crucial connection between the different identities. The specific escalation 
and group mobilization around these disputes can only be grasped when taking this 
notion into account. Secondly, this has some specific consequences for the manner in 
which conflict management/mediation is organized. As illustrated, impersonal 
institutional forums – both in the formal and the informal sphere – which can serve as 
the necessary vehicles for third party mediation are scarce. As a result, disputes have 
a tendency to develop into a deadlock where everybody is implicated and very few 
people or organizations can transcend the cleavages, including local MILF 
commanders and MILF political committees. In such instances, the last resort is 
recourse to specific types of civil society organizations that have developed an 
impartial ‘proximate distance’ to the conflicted parties. We will elaborate further on 
this crucial position of the Bangsamoro civil society in the section below.     
 
Part 2: Bangsamoro civil society and its ‘organic members’ 
 
Beyond an elite-driven framework 
There is a general tendency within TAF to link effective conflict management and 
dispute settlement with ‘powerful people’ or ‘elites’. Throughout different meetings 
where conflict management interventions by TAF were discussed, it was stressed how 
working through a coalition of elite actors is a rapid and cost-efficient way to settle 
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disputes.22 The implicit assumption was that elites – more so than ‘common people’ – 
have the capacity to enforce a certain degree of compliance because of their elite 
status. Based on an analysis of a range of mediation efforts in Muslim Mindanao, it 
can indeed be confirmed that compliance and authority are central features in any 
attempt at sustainably settling certain disputes. However, the assumption that elites 
will get things done because of the mere fact that they are elites, is in itself short-
sighted. Our discussion above, concerning the dispute between the Dalandas and 
Dandua clan in the barangay of Luanan, provides some indications that additional 
factors need to be taken into account. Above all, our empirical data clearly point at the 
need to install some sort of impersonal institutional forum/organization/institutional 
venue which acts as a medium of exchange between disputing parties. In this 
particular case, this proved to be as important as the establishment of an elite coalition 
which ‘overrules’ the disputing parties.  
This observation brings to the foreground new actors who have not always received 
the attention they deserve. These consist of a wide range of Muslim civil society 
organizations, deeply rooted in society but at the same time maintaining a critical 
distance from contending centers of power. To a certain extent, one could state that 
our focus hereby shifts from ‘hard power’ (elites, compliance, power, coercion, blood 
money) towards an alternative type of ‘soft power’ (civil society, neutrality, 
deliberation, distance, women’s organization).  One could hereby also claim that these 
groups remain purposefully invisible as their intervention is deliberately situated in 
the background. However, this background position does not imply that the 
organizations display no agency. On closer scrutiny, it is clear that such organizations 
have a carefully planned agenda, deliberate strategy and some ambitious ideological 
objectives they want to reach. Importantly, these ideological objectives are much 
more elaborate than a broadly defined ‘pro-peace’ vision. Rather, they are framed 
within a political project centered around the development of a just and democratic 
Bangsamoro. In this regard, we do not claim to cover all of Muslim civil society; not 
even those CVOs (Civilian Volunteer Organizations) explicitly working on issues of 
conflict and peace. As has been illustrated elsewhere23,  Muslim civil society even in 
the field of conflict and peace interventions, comprises a wide variety of organizations 
involved in a diversity of activities including interreligious dialogue, lobbying for a 
peace agreement, and micro-level conflict management interventions. Within the 
report by Rood, this last type of organization seems to have focused especially on the 
establishment of so-called zones of peace. It seems that in recent years these 
initiatives have somewhat waned and made room for interventions rooted in models 
of third party mediation. Moreover, it seems that the issue of rido has recently taken 
greater prominence in these initiatives compared to ten or fifteen years ago when the 
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 TAF-JSRP inception workshop, 12-02-2013, Manila: TAF office. Based on this introductory 
workshop, it seems that this view is widely shared among TAF personnel working on conflict 
management and peacebuilding. 
23
 Rood, S. (2005). Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao. The Role of Civil Society. Washington: 
the East-West Center (Policy Studies 7).  
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focus was still very much on the classic ‘separatist’ conflict. However, despite these 
differences, what we would like to stress is the very politicized nature of the 
interventions we have been studying and the very tactical alliances that are emerging 
based on this political reading of the local landscape. However, before discussing 
some of these issues more in detail, we first need to delve a little deeper into the 
‘proximate distance’ these organizations maintain against contending centers of 
power.  
As has already been illustrated elsewhere, one should be very careful with the concept 
of informal conflict management for a number of reasons. First, what is understood as 
informal conflict management concerns above all a specific practice that is centered 
around mediation and consultation as opposed to punitive justice. Importantly, this 
mediation and consultation is organized both outside as well as inside formal state 
institutions (and all the grey zones in between).24 Secondly, the involvement of CVOs 
or traditional/customary leaders does not by definition presume we are dealing with 
an informal type of conflict management situated outside the state.  A range of state-
sanctioned conflict management institutions exsit, of which the ‘Peace and Order 
Council/Committee’ is probably the most relevant one. Within this institution, a 
representation of civil society is mandatory. 25  However, the Peace and Order 
Council/Committee is presided over by the mayor/barangay captain and he/she is also 
the one appointing the CVO representatives. Many of the CVOs working on conflict 
management are thus not only ‘dragged’ into the state but often obtain their 
legitimacy as conflict management CVOs through this explicit connection with the 
local state. When a new administration is appointed, a range of these CVOs are 
pushed out of these institutions and a new set of organizations/people are integrated. 
Because of their overt connection with the previous administration, there is a 
considerable chance these CVOs also become largely ineffective and irrelevant. 
Important for our argument here is the fact that, due to the discretionary power of the 
executive over these state-sanctioned mechanisms, these institutions are no longer 
considered as impartial and impersonal fora through which disputes can be settled. 
Rather, they are (rightly) understood as an extension of the power of the 
mayor/barangay captain and as a result often become paralyzed within a fractured 
socio-political landscape. This was also the reason why an institution such as the 
Peace and Order Council/Committee was never truly considered as an adequate 
vehicle to settle the dispute between the Dalandas and the Danduas.  
Interestingly, both the MWDECC and the LPI-MAPAD were very much aware of this 
and it is exactly here that we have to understand the sort of ‘proximate distance’ we 
touched upon above. These organizations deliberately distanced themselves from 
                                                 
24
 Adam, J. and vanden Boer, D. (2015). Conflict mediation and traditional authority in the province of 
Lanao del Sur, Mindanao, London: TAF-JSRP Paper 26 (The Asia Foundation - Justice and Security 
Research Programme/London School of Economics) 
25
 Adam, J.; Verbrugge, B. and vanden Boer, D. (2014). Informal Conflict Management in Exclusivist 
Political Orders. Some Observations on Central Mindanao, The Austrian Journal of South-East Asian 
Studies, 7(1): 61-74. 
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clan, clan politics and above all, electoral competition. At the same time, as a CVO, 
they managed to maintain a visibility in the community. For instance, in the case of 
the MWDECC, this visibility centered around a range of women’s empowerment 
activities. Hence the ‘proximate distance’ they attempt to build up by carefully trying 
not to become absorbed in sensitive political conflicts while maintaining a presence 
and visibility in the community. At first sight, this retreat from electoral politics 
degrades these CVOs into organizing harmless leisure activities organized around a 
vague concept of empowerment and Bangsamoro identity. Yet, nothing is farther 
from the truth. As already illustrated, these CVOs have managed to transform 
themselves into the last impersonal institutional forum through which disputes can be 
settled. However, their political agency is much more pronounced than this. It is 
against the background of their specific reading of the socio-political landscape that 
we have to understand the supposedly ‘accidental’ alliance that emerged between 
these CVOs and the MILF political committee. In a context where elitist clan politics 
is being rejected and electoral democracy is no longer considered a credible 
opportunity to challenge this, the MILF comes to be imagined by many people as the 
sole alternative. As such, the MWDECC and LPI-MAPAD clearly understood their 
developmental work and specific conflict management intervention as part of a 
broader strategy of supporting and reinforcing a transparent and democratic MILF 
that transcends clan divisions and comes to act as a unifying force for all Muslims in 
the Philippines. We will return to some of these discussions in the following section.  
The MILF as a civil organization 
A close analysis of the daily functioning of organizations such as MWDECC and LPI-
MAPAD sheds a new light on the complex and versatile character of an organization 
such as the MILF. In the first part of this paper, we argued that an understanding of 
the MILF can only be relational, outlining how MILF/state/clan identities are not 
mutually exclusive. Despite this argument for a relational analysis, membership of the 
MILF was still approached in a rather straightforward manner; either as actual 
commanders/fighters and/or members of an MILF political committee. Yet, 
narrowing down the MILF to just armed fighters or members of a political committee 
would be a grave simplification. What our analysis brings to the fore is a new group 
that can be defined as ‘sympathizers’ or ‘volunteers’ who identify with the 
organization in a much more implicit and hidden way. Importantly, we are not 
referring here to a particular percentage of the population who express sympathies for 
or identifies with the MILF. Rather, what we wish to draw attention to is a particular 
set of persons and organizations involved in range of social/developmental projects 
that are framed and represented as supporting the MILF as a civil organization. It is 
exactly this group of people who are being referred to as the ‘organic members’ of the 
MILF. As somebody defining himself as an organic member explained, being an 
organic member implies that one ‘endorses the aspirations of the MILF and provides 
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some help now and then’.26 In our opinion, these organic members and their support 
for the MILF have been crucial for the impressive growth of the MILF the past twenty 
five years.  
As an illustration, we wish to refer to the recent history of the municipality of 
Midsayap, province of North Cotabato. As described in our earlier publication, this 
municipality was subject to intense periods of warfare between rival clan leaders-
cum-warlords displaying to a varying degree allegiance to either the MILF or the 
MNLF or just nobody at all.27 One of the major incentives for these violent clashes 
was control over state patronage funds at the municipal and barangay level which had 
considerably increased after the 1991 local government code.  Much of the violence 
that happened should therefore be understood as electoral violence. Interestingly, all 
respondents from the area agreed that from the mid-2000’s onwards, a gradual but 
notable decrease could be observed in the intensity of the fighting and the overall 
brutality of these warlord politics.28 Obviously, the reasons for this are diverse. For 
instance one of the most notorious commanders/warlords died in April 2006. 
Nevertheless, our data clearly point to a considerable increase in the coercive capacity 
and - probably more importantly - the social legitimacy of the MILF as the prime 
explanation for the reduction of violence in this region. As indicated, the authority of 
the MILF should be understood as being mediated through existing centers of 
authority. This is still the case. However, one cannot deny that a central ‘core-MILF’ 
has attempted - and to a certain degree managed - to reinforce their control over these 
‘loose’ commanders. In this specific context, this ‘core-MILF’ was being referred to 
as Darapanan, the name of an important MILF camp situated in the municipality of 
Sultan Kudarat about twenty kilometers away from Midsayap. For example, in 
instances where disputes erupted between rival MILF commanders, a more active 
intervention of BIAF forces stationed at camp Darapanan was noted. Also, pressure 
was put on local commanders/politicians to stop, or at least curb, the extortion 
practices that  were very common at that time and that mainly comprised exploitative 
sharecropping agreements.29 Without doubt, the capacity of this core MILF went hand 
in hand with the establishment of mechanisms such as the CCCH (Coordinating 
Commission on the Cessation of Hostilities) in 199730 and the AHJAG (Ad Hoc Joint 
Action Group)31 . Simply put, these mechanisms need to be understood as state-
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 Interview with Haji Gafor Ahmad, member Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), (Cotabato 
city, 03-02-2014). 
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 Verbrugge, B. and Adam, J. (2015). Questioning the State-Rebel divide in Mindanao? A 
Comparative Analysis of North Cotabato and Compostela Valley province, Asian Journal of Social 
Science, 44 (1): 247-287.  
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 Interview with Maks Mangadta, Minhrac (Mindanao Human Rights Action Committee) member, 
(Cotabato city, 28-01-2014) ; Interview Anwar Saluwang (UNYPAD member), (Cotabato city, 31-01-
2014). 
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 Focus group discussion with UNYPAD community organizers, (Midsayap, 12-03-2013). 
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 Implementing Operational Guidelines of the Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities 
(1997) http://www.opapp.gov.ph/resources/implementing-operational-guidelines-agreement-general-
cessation-hostilities  
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 Implementing Guidelines of the 2002 AHJAG Communique (2002) 
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mandated institutions which acknowledge the MILF as a legitimate security provider. 
As such, they have helped the central leadership MILF to build-up symbolic state and 
coercive authority that clearly transcends divisive clan politics.  
Importantly, this increase in the coercive capacity by the core-MILF cannot be 
understood without taking into account the crucial role, played by a proactive 
Bangsamoro civil society. First of all, in a similar manner as described for the 
Dalandas versus Dandua dispute, Bangsamoro civil society in the Midsayap case took 
up a position of proximate distance towards disputing clans.  In this way, they 
managed to act as a neutral institutional venue through which different disputes could 
be settled. Meanwhile, they maintained vital links with the ‘core MILF’ and local 
MILF political committees. In this instance, we are specifically referring to the United 
Youth for Peace and Development (UNYPAD) that organized a range of so-called 
Quick Response Teams (QRTs) as vehicles through which conflict management 
interventions were deployed. In contrast to the position taken by MWDECC, these 
QRT’s needed formal approval by the barangay captain in order to function. Thus, 
their position was not one of absolute autonomy from local state institutions. On the 
other hand, a deliberate policy was instigated by UNYPAD wherein their QRT 
members were obliged to remain non-partisan in times of elections. There were also 
careful and ongoing deliberations between UNYPAD leaders and the barangay 
captain, stressing that the QRTs should never become vehicles in the hands of local 
politicians since they would lose their relevance as neutral venues of conflict 
management. Despite this, all UNYPAD members stressed that such political 
neutrality remained a difficult and careful balancing act.32  
In this case too, the loose but strategic coalition between a Bangsamoro civil society 
organization and the core MILF is not coincidental. Rather, it is rooted in the 
UNYPAD leadership’s conviction that ultimately the MILF is the only credible 
organization capable of bringing sustainable security in the region.33 This belief is 
based on an assessment of ‘warlord politics’ as being greedy, brutal and therefore 
unsustainable, as well as on disappointment in, and distrust of, formal state security 
institutions such as the AFP and the PNP. However, when looking specifically at the 
Midsayap case, this positioning of a core MILF in providing security in tandem with a 
Bangsamoro civil society of organic members needs to be situated within a wider 
attempt by the MILF to profile themselves as a credible and socially legitimate 
governance alternative. This alternative needs to be situated against the violent and 
exploitative clan politics that totally destabilized the municipality throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. Importantly, apart from some specific attempts to improve the 
physical security of the residents of Midsayap over the past ten to fifteen years, a 
range of initiatives have been implemented that had a clear redistributive objective. 
These initiatives were often organized in collaboration with religious leaders and 
institutions. One notable example concerns the collection of taxes. As mentioned, the 
                                                 
32
 Focus group discussion with UNYPAD community organizers, (Midsayap, 12-03-2013). 
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 Focus group discussion with UNYPAD leadership, (Cotabato city, 07-02-2014). 
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height of warlord politics in Midsayap was characterized by high levels of extortion. 
At a certain moment, the MILF attempted and ultimately succeeded in putting a halt 
to these practices. Mechanisms were deliberately set up where people could state their 
complaints if they felt they were being extorted by certain warlord politicians. This 
mechanism was understood as a crucial ‘bumper’ to protect civilians against greedy 
warlord practices.34 This was complemented by the establishment of an alternative 
taxation system which was set up by the MILF in coordination with religious leaders. 
A traditional Muslim institution such as ‘the zakat’ was hereby revived and collected 
through MILF-appointed tax collectors. One of the purposes of this zakat money 
clearly was to reinforce the financial capacity of the MILF. However, equally 
important was the fact that this zakat money also served various social purposes, such 
as financial support for the elderly and widows or paying certain tuition fees for 
young people. This gradual transformation from extortion towards a tax with a 
redistributive purpose has become an important symbolic reference point for many 
people in Midsayap and has clearly added to the popularity and legitimacy of the 
MILF as a credible civil organization.                
Conclusion 
In the second part of this paper we have attempted to shed light on the so-called 
‘organic members’ of the MILF. These organic members are hereby defined as that 
part of the population that not only has a certain sympathy for the cause of the MILF 
but that is also – albeit to varying degrees – engaged in the development of the MILF 
as a civil organization and credible governance alternative. We have attempted to 
illustrate this point by referring to some initiatives of conflict management in the 
municipalities of Aleosan and Midsayap (North Cotabato). In both municipalities, we 
see how a loose but tactical alliance has emerged between a Bangsamoro civil society 
and what can be referred to as a core-MILF. While this core-MILF provides a degree 
of coercive capacity, these CVOs or organic members provide some sort of ‘soft 
power’ since they act as neutral venues through which disputing parties can settle 
their feuds. With this crucial observation, we have also attempted to nuance the view 
that successful conflict management and third party mediation depends solely on the 
incorporation of powerful elite networks. Importantly, conflict management is only 
one arena wherein the MILF has attempted - and in some cases managed - to profile 
themselves as a legitimate governance institution. As has also been illustrated, similar 
attempts have been made to install a system of redistributive taxation. These 
observations lead us to two crucial and related arguments. First, the 
(successful/unsuccessful) attempts by the MILF to profile themselves as a more just, 
equitable and legitimate governance alternative when compared to a type of brutal 
and exploitative warlord politics is key to understanding the growth of this 
organization over the past two decades. This also implies that too often, the MILF has 
been reduced or even misunderstood as a mere ‘rebel group’ or armed organization 
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(Cotabato city, 28-01-2014); Interview with Anwar Saluwang (UNYPAD member), (Cotabato city, 31-
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while this coercive aspect is only one component of much more complex civil 
organization. Secondly, the role played by an active Bangsamoro civil society within 
the ‘social’ development of the MILF is key but is too often underrated. Having said 
this, we will now elaborate on some of the specific ideological features of this project.        
 
Part 3:  Religion, purity and equality  
 
In this final section we wish to put forward the argument that the proliferation of the 
MILF as a credible governance alternative cannot be understood without taking a 
specific religious discourse into account. We wish to illustrate this at two levels. First, 
it will be argued how the idea of equality in Islam functioned as a pivotal mobilizing 
discourse vis-à-vis an image of a feudalistic and elite-based democracy. Second, we 
will illustrate how an ideal of religious purity rooted in Sharia is systematically 
contrasted with an image of moral degradation, both in the political as well as the 
wider societal arena.   
Religion and equal citizenship         
In order to grasp the mobilizing quality of Islam as an ideology of equality, it is 
necessary to understand what this equality is being contrasted with. Obviously there is 
no single narrative or common assessment of the political landscape in Mindanao 
which is shared by everyone. As will be shown below, Muslim Mindanao is not an 
entity that speaks as a unified voice but is instead subject to deep societal and 
ideological divisions of different sorts. Nevertheless, based on a range of informal 
interactions and formal interviews with those who can be labeled as ‘organic 
members’ within the orbit of the MILF, we wish to highlight two important recurrent 
features that appear to be widely shared. First, there is the obvious issue of the clan-
based character of politics and the manner in which a limited number of elite clans 
manage to monopolize political power in the region. In this view, clan politics distorts 
an ideal of electoral democracy as a system based on equal rights and wherein a fair 
and transparent assessment can be made of what constitutes credible and legitimate 
political leadership. Secondly, this ‘internal’ critique of power imbalances within 
Muslim society is often linked with a more classic ‘external’ critique of ‘Imperial 
Manila’. Simply put, the sort of divisive and corrupted clan politics is understood as 
an extension of national politics wherein politicians are integrated in patronage 
networks tying them to the capital and to national political parties.35 Meanwhile, such 
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 There are some interesting parallels to be drawn with the observation that the establishment of the 
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practices are understood as dividing a unified Bangsamoro political project. The case 
proving this point par excellence can be found in the Ampatuan clan.  This was 
understood by many as the product of a deliberate ‘divide and rule’ strategy by 
Manila, whereby this particular clan is being actively supported by national political 
elites for their own benefit. 36  Not coincidentally, the Ampatuan clan is also 
considered to be among the most vocal and fierce opponents of the MILF.  
All this can partly be understood as confirmation of the generally accepted view that 
political life in Muslim Mindanao still revolves very much around the institution of 
clan. On the other hand, these observations also point to a great deal of dissatisfaction 
among different sections of Muslim society about the way elite-based clan structures 
are being reproduced. While this may seem evident at first sight, this is a crucial 
observation that has not always been taken into account in much of the literature on 
Muslim Mindanao where there has been an explicit focus on a limited selection of 
prominent clans considered to be kingmakers in the socio-political landscape. The 
(often implicit) assumption is that politics in Muslim Mindanao is very much elite-
driven and therefore one needs, above all, to study these elites. This is not necessarily 
wrong, both for Muslim Mindanao as well as for most other regions in the 
Philippines.37 On the other hand, this explicit focus on elites/prominent clans risks 
grossly underestimating the political agency of the majority of the population in 
Muslim Mindanao who happen not to have Mastura, Sinsuat, Pendatun or any other 
famous clan as their family name. This was well captured by a local, young, well-
educated man who is a volunteer for UNYPAD and a couple of other Muslim CVOS. 
When informally talking about the prospects for making a decent living and obtaining 
a secure financial income in the town of Cotabato, the respondent somewhat abruptly 
mentioned: ‘I am nobody’.38 When discussing this further, it appeared that this was 
not so much an expression of a profound existential crisis. Rather, what was being 
referred to was the observation that not being part of a well-known clan seriously 
                                                                                                                                           
MNLF and the MILF should not only be understood as a reaction against ‘imperial Manila’ but also as 
an indication of  how generational and class-differences within Muslim society are of relevance. 
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impedes one’s prospects for any type of upward social mobility or even just secure 
income generation. In other words, the clan as an institution is still very prominent in 
most parts of Muslim Mindanao but this should not divert our attention away from the 
very wide dissatisfaction and unease that surround this institution. This observation 
therefore nuances the widely held view that in Muslim Mindanao clan is everything. 
Clan is more important for some than for others and for many in Muslim Mindanao 
who do not belong to a powerful clan, the clan structure is often perceived as an 
oppressive institution with some very authoritarian features. 
Religion - and more specifically an ideal of equality within Islam - has become one of 
the prime locations where dissatisfaction with clan politics is being expressed. To 
illustrate this point, it is interesting to refer to two different quotes. Tellingly, the first 
quote is by an elder, male leader of an important clan in the Lanao region. When 
discussing the meaning of traditional leadership, he stated:  
‘If you are not descendent from the Sharif,39 then you are member of the third 
class people. First class belong to the royal blood, second class people who are 
not slaves but not royal blood, third class people those are slaves. If you don’t 
know where you belong you will become third class people. Even if you are very 
rich you cannot become Sultan if you are not first class.’40 
It is interesting to contrast this statement with a quote from a young, female CVO 
activist and member of MWDECC when she states:  
‘Actually in Islam, it’s not about, you’re from the royal blood, from the blue 
blood or green blood, there is no high class, low class. As long you’re practicing 
Islam, then, that’s who possesses royal blood. Those who are educated in Islam 
don’t think that ‘oh, I’m the good one, because I’m from the royal blood or I’m 
the good one because I’m the daughter of a datu’, no. If you are Islamized. If 
you’re eligible of religion, then you will erase that idea. You will not claim that 
you’re good. Because me, when I’m educated already, I don’t have to say I’m 
from the royal blood just to gain respect, no. Because when practicing my 
beliefs,  practicing Islam, I already gain the respect. I didn’t ask for it.’41 
These are very contrasting political statements about the place of clan, lineage and 
religion in society. It should also be mentioned that an opinion on social stratification 
articulated as explicitly as in the first quote is rather exceptional; although the unease 
of many traditional clan leaders with democratic elections ran as a thread throughout 
many interviews.42 In addition, we wish to be cautious with statements about the deep 
generational, gender- or class-based divisions in Muslim Mindanao and how these are 
ideologically translated. The largely qualitative nature of this research project does 
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 Focus group discussion with members Tara clan, (Illigan city, 16-09-2013). 
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not provide adequate quantitative evidence to make such bold statements. Suffice to 
say that these tensions are clearly present at the moment. Yet what the quote above 
clearly points to is the crucial observation that religion/Islam - much more than any 
other ideological framework such as nationalism, liberalism, communism, or 
socialism etc - has become a space, even a particular language, through which a 
political critique is being articulated.  
Religion and moral purity 
A second discussion that we want to touch upon in this section is the ideal of moral 
purity rooted in Islam, that is systematically contrasted with ongoing political 
practices of corruption, nepotism and sheer greed and a perception of a more general 
moral decay engulfing Muslim society. In projecting this ideal of religious purity, 
Sharia takes a central place. Sharia cannot just be understood as a judicial system - 
which it partly is - but gains relevance as a much broader guideline for moral conduct. 
In understanding the issue of Sharia, it is crucial to differentiate between so-called 
state-mandated Sharia courts and the informal Sharia courts that are generally 
considered to be close to the MILF. These state-mandated Sharia courts were created 
in 1977 through Presidential Decree No. 1083 entitled ‘Code of Muslim Personal 
Laws of the Philippines.’43 The main areas covered by these state-mandated courts 
include: marriage and divorce, paternity and filiation, parental authority and 
succession. As such, the Sharia courts remain limited to the private sphere. Most 
importantly, there was a general assessment that their significance is limited, due 
amongst other things to their urban location that makes them rather inaccessible for 
the large majority of the rural population in Muslim Mindanao. A second type of 
Sharia courts are the so-called informal Sharia courts which in general are closely 
tied to MILF structures. For instance, one interviewed MILF commander of the 102th 
base command of the North Western Mindanao Front, also acted as a religious leader 
and presided at a specific Sharia court we will discuss later in this section. Based on 
our data, it is impossible to provide a general assessment on these informal Sharia 
courts and it seems that their reach and relevance is very context-dependent. 
However, what is clear is that these courts have a specific appeal as very concrete 
alternative institutions of jurisdiction and more general guides of moral conduct. Tow 
related issues will illustrate this point.      
First, this appeal is linked to the establishment of certain MILF camps as zones 
wherein politics was/is being conducted according to Sharia and religious principles. 
Interestingly, within these camps, the MILF did not have to resort to the type of 
mediated authority described above but these camps were (among the few) places 
where the MILF could exert some sort of full control. As such, these places became 
very concrete examples of how a true societal alternative, organized by the MILF, 
would look. Throughout different interviews, a specific importance was ascribed to 
camp Abubakar. Throughout the 1990s this was by far the most important MILF 
camp until it was overtaken by the AFP in 2000 through an all-out war between the 
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Philippine government and the MILF. Remarkably, the camp is not just remembered 
as a symbol of fierce armed resistance against the Philippine government. The 
relevance of the camp is also understood as a showcase example of how a MILF 
controlled area could look if Sharia was implemented. For instance, we discussed 
earlier the gradual penetration of the MILF into the municipality of Midsayap from 
the mid-1990s onwards through the provision of social security services and 
successful attempts to curb inter-clan rivalry. An additional factor that was regularly 
mentioned for why the MILF considerably widened their circle of supporters in the 
municipality was the ‘shining example’ of camp Abubakar as a place of order and 
tranquility.44 As constantly mentioned by people who resided in the camp or just 
visited the place, this was a beacon of peace and stability where clan feuding was 
absent and criminality non-existent.45 Most important of all, this was understood as an 
example where Sharia proved its superiority over other societal systems, not only in 
providing law and order but equally in making sure no waste was dumped, business 
people were honest in their dealings etc.  As a result, it is no surprise that people who 
resided in the camp put forward the opinion that: ‘Tradition should follow Islam and 
this Sharia’. 46  This was also pertinent among the network of LPI-MWDECC 
volunteers when they explicitly stated in a focus group discussion that the success of 
camp Abubakar was a direct inspiration for their grassroots social work. In fact, 
MWDECC was partly founded based on a network of women who went for regular 
annual ‘teaching sessions’ on Islam in this camp.  
A second issue that should be mentioned here is the symbolic importance ascribed to 
the drugs trade.47   Increasingly, the issue of drugs is considered to be a huge societal 
problem destroying the lives of many, in particular the young. It is also clear that 
much of the violence, for example in the city center of Cotabato but also in other 
places, is related to control over the drugs trade. The MILF is deliberately attempting 
to curb this trade by punishing so-called ‘drug pushers’ and setting up specific rehab 
facilities for drug users, in place such as the tiny islands on Lake Lanao. Within this 
endeavor to curb the drugs trade and drug use, Sharia is explicitly being put forward 
as a specific punitive framework and moral compass guiding people to refrain from 
using drugs. A telling illustration of these efforts was the establishment of a so-called 
‘Sharia mobile’ with the explicit attempt to eradicate the drugs trade (and other forms 
of criminality). 48   Interestingly, when interviewing Alim Abu Halif, the 
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(Cotabato city, 28-01-2014). 
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 It is difficult to prove whether this was the case or not. However, most importancly, a discourse 
exists that many people believe to be true, even those who never visited the camp.    
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 Interview Haji Gafor Ahmad, member Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), (Cotabato city, 
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 For an assessment of the drugs trade, see: Cagoco-Guim, R. and Schoofs, S. (2013) A Deadly 
Cocktail? Illicit Drugs, Politics and Violent Conflict in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, in: Steven 
Schoofs and Francisco Lara (eds.), Out of the Shadows. Violent Conflict and the Real Economy of 
Mindanao, London: International Alert, pp. 85-118. 
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 At the time of fieldwork, this project was still at an experimental stage and only ran in the territory 
controlled by MILF commander Bravo (102nd base command). However, it was stated that if the 
initiative was judged a success it would be extended to other regions in Muslim Mindanao. 
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aforementioned division commander of the 102th base command of the North 
Western Mindanao Front and one of the founding members of  Sharia mobile, he 
argued that the main purpose of this initiative consisted of ‘transforming 
misbehaviour’ and showing people that the MILF is much more than just a military 
organization.49 This mission in others words implied an ideological project wherein a 
‘dark situation’ would be transformed into a ‘bright path’ or so-called kalinitat or 
peace. A fundamental component within this societal transformation is to prevent the 
further expansion of the drugs trade, so that the population see the MILF having a 
positive impact on the community.   
Conclusion 
In this final section, we have illustrated how the ideological and political project of 
the MILF cannot be disconnected from its religious component. More specifically, 
based on a range of informal and formal interviews with organic members of the 
MILF and MILF commanders, we have argued how (1) religion has served as a 
discourse on equality through which power imbalances within Muslim society are 
being exposed and critiqued and (2) how the imposition of a new religious purity 
rooted within Sharia is systematically being contrasted with an image of broad 
political and societal decay. We have attempted to illustrate the second point by 
referring to the existence of (past) MILF camps being portrayed as places of stability, 
decency and good governance and by citing the explicit attempts undertaken by the 
MILF in curbing the trade in drugs and their use.  
 
General conclusion 
 
This paper has put forward the argument that the growth of the MILF over the past 
two decades needs to be explained through its positioning as a legitimate, viable and 
concrete alternative to a flawed democracy wherein (clan-based) elites reproduce 
themselves. This observation draws attention to the ‘internal’ fault-lines and political 
discussions within Muslim society and therefore adds to a dominant narrative trying 
to explain the emergence of the MILF and the broader struggle for self-determination 
and an autonomous Bangsamoro. This dominant narrative is an ‘externally oriented’ 
one, since it puts great emphasis on the marginalized status of the Muslim population 
overall within the Philippine nation state. Our aim is not to say that this assessment is 
wrong. Rather, with this paper, we attempt to add another layer of understanding to 
the reasons behind the quest for self-determination and, above all, to point to different 
dimensions and scales of political grievances and how these relate to each other. It is 
hereby worth noting that for many MILF supporters, the failings of democracy and 
the systematic reproduction of unequal power relations in their own locality are 
intimately tied up with the workings of the larger national body politic that is 
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considered as corrupted and nurturing local elites who preside over these quasi-
totalitarian enclaves. It is also against this background that the specific religious 
ideology of the MILF needs to be understood. This religious ideology and the 
prominence of Sharia herein serve as an ideal of moral purity as opposed to a 
corrupted political and societal landscape. This religious discourse projects an ideal of 
absolute equality that is contrasted with the current unequal society dominated by 
feudal clans.   
The manner in which the MILF opposes local strongmen is not always clear-cut and 
is often ambiguous. As extensively shown throughout this paper, the label ‘MILF’ 
covers a wide range of organizations, members, and identities. In particular, clan and 
other loyalties run right across the organization. In a political landscape that is heavily 
dominated by local strongmen and where the clan is still the dominant social 
institution bridging state and society, it seems that the MILF has followed a policy of 
slow and gradual incorporation rather than brutal confrontation. As such, an 
ambiguous picture emerges wherein local political strongmen, in some cases with 
highly authoritarian and undemocratic credentials, identify as MILF. It is clear that 
these local strongmen display a great deal of autonomy against the central political 
leadership and a delicate balancing act is maintained. Therefore, it is crucial not to 
portray or approach the MILF as a homogeneous group but to pay attention to the 
different fault lines, cleavages and sometimes contrasting political objectives that 
reside within this one organization. However, despite this complexity, and based on 
our data, we have distinguished three major social fields within the MILF:  1) a 
central leadership referred to as ‘core MILF’ and in general associated with MILF 
camps such as Abubakr or Darapanan;  2) a wide variety of local power-holders/local 
commanders who display varying degrees of allegiance to this core MILF; and 
finally, 3) a coalition of CVOs or ‘organic members’. The main characteristic of this 
last group is that it consists of ‘ordinary’ citizens playing no direct role in the military 
organization of the MILF. These ordinary citizens can be either formal members of 
the MILF or people/organizations working in the orbit of the core MILF. Our 
classification of these three social fields does not pretend to be complete or definitive 
but is one that enables us to obtain a better understanding of the cases we have 
discussed in this paper. 
When studying the interaction between these social fields, three important things 
stand out. First, based on an analysis of the recent history of the municipality of 
Midsayap, North Cotabato, it seems that some sort of core-MILF has managed to 
obtain increasing control over a range of local political leaders. In this particular 
municipality, the core-MILF was understood as those MILF fighters and leaders 
residing in Darapanan camp. Increasingly, a system of sanctioning has been 
implemented whereby local MILF commanders/political leaders and their respective 
followers are threatened with being taken into custody by the core MILF if they do 
not follow certain specific policies. Evidently, the implementation of a range of state-
sanctioned mechanisms to curb violence and criminality where the MILF plays a 
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central role has also added to the capacity of this core MILF. This increase in coercive 
capacity has gone hand in hand with deliberate attempts by the MILF to present 
themselves as a sincere and legitimate alternative to a type of warlord politics that 
was clearly violent, exploitative, authoritarian and therefore unpopular. 
Second, a wide network of Muslim CVOs has been crucial to the development of the 
MILF as a civil organization. It is precisely this network that often shares a negative 
assessment of the type of warlord politics that, in their view, hinders any true political 
and economic development in the region. Based on this frustration, this network sees 
a credible governance alternative in the MILF, which they wish to support in a variety 
of non-violent ways. Much more than might initially be imagined, this type of civil 
support has been crucial in a number of governance arenas and therefore in the 
growth of the MILF as a legitimate civil organization. One specific example discussed 
in this paper is the role this network plays in conflict management and reconciliation 
initiatives. The arena of conflict management also provides a good illustration of the 
manner in which the three social fields within the MILF interact with each other. 
Simply put, this network of ‘organic members’ has been pivotal in establishing a 
venue through which disputing clans could communicate with each other to find a 
solution to their violent dispute. It is also here that the limits of the MILF as a rebel 
group become visible. As local MILF commanders also display a great deal of 
allegiance to their clan, the MILF becomes dragged into this fractionalized landscape, 
heavily reducing its legitimacy to mediate as a neutral third party. It is at this point 
that a crucial tactical alliance emerged between the core MILF and a network of 
organic members. As illustrated, this particular network, aided by international NGOs 
such as TAF, proved effective in settling this particular dispute. 
This brings us to a third and last point. This paper paints a picture of the MILF as 
much more than just an armed rebel group. Much of the literature on political 
developments in Muslim Mindanao over the past decades has explicitly focused on 
the actual motives and/or immediate causes of violence in the region. As a result, our 
understanding of an organization such as the MILF has been highly distorted and 
biased, since the organization has been mainly approached as merely an armed group. 
Our analysis has shown that this approach is wrong by illustrating how a group of 
organizations and people who are clearly not hardened fighters or involved in the 
upper hierarchy of the MILF, have nevertheless played an essential role in the 
development of the organization and ultimately, in the struggle for an autonomous 
Bangsamoro. The political agency of these subaltern populations and organizations 
has been fundamental to the development and growth of the MILF, not only as an 
oppositional alternative to ‘imperial Manila’ but equally as an oppositional alternative 
to local clan-based elites.    
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